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Abstract—This paper represents a developed cryptographic 
information protection algorithm based on a substitution-
permutation network. We describe the cryptographic 
transformations used in the developed algorithm. One of the 
features of the algorithm is the simplicity of its modification with 
regard to different security levels. The algorithm uses a pre-
developed S-box tested against differential and linear 
cryptanalysis. The S-box is consistent with one of the known 
standards AES and GOST R 34.12-2015. We provide the findings 
of an avalanche-effect investigation and statistical properties of 
ciphertexts. The algorithm actually meets the avalanche-effect 
criterion even after the first round. 
 
Keywords—encryption, cryptanalysis, S-box, SP-network, 
avalanche effect, statistical property 
I. INTRODUCTION 
YMMETRIC block encryption algorithms are today the 
principal cryptographic tool for ensuring confidentiality in 
data processing in up-to-date information and 
telecommunication systems [1,2]. Modern symmetric block 
ciphers are mainly built based on two approaches: Feistel 
network and substitution-permutation network (SP-network). 
As is known, ciphers are based on reversible transformations 
of plaintext. When working on ciphers, care must be exercised 
that every operation performed is both cryptographically 
robust and reversible under a known key [3]. 
Present-day ciphers are based on the Kerckhoffs' Principle 
[4] that the security of a cipher is ensured by keeping secret the 
key, but not the encryption algorithm. From the viewpoint of 
an adversary, a secure cryptosystem is a "black box", the input 
and output information sequences of which are mutually 
independent, provided that the output encrypted sequence is 
pseudorandom [5,6]. Thus, a ciphertext obtained is 
investigated for pseudorandomness by using statistical tests 
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(testing). It is analyzed the dependence of changes in the 
ciphertext when changing characters or bits in the original 
plaintext or key. Different types of such an analysis are aimed 
to detect statistical particularities or any dependence between 
characters of the plaintext and the ciphertext. 
In the cryptographic information protection facilities in use, 
the length of a message secured with a symmetric block cipher 
generally far exceeds the length of an encryption key. In this 
situation, the criterion of unconditional security of the utilized 
cipher is not fulfilled [5-9]. Against this background, the 
strength of an encryption algorithm is based on the assumption 
that an adversary has time and computer power limits. This 
implies the definition of practical strength criterion, i.e. it is 
impossible for a long time to implement an attack on a cipher 
within the conditions of present-day computing base. 
Block ciphers are also used as a base unit to build other 
cryptographic algorithms (primitives), such as pseudorandom 
sequence generators (PRNG), stream ciphers, and hash 
functions. The level of strength and the properties of the 
symmetric block encryption algorithm in use govern to a large 
extent the strength of cryptographic information protection 
facilities, the security of cryptographic protocols, and 
protection of an information and communication system as a 
whole [5-9]. 
A secure block cipher should meet certain conditions. These 
conditions were given by Claude Shannon in a number of his 
fundamental papers on the theory of encryption [10-12]. A 
secure cipher should have the properties of diffusion and 
confusion. 
Diffusion means that one character (bit) of an input plaintext 
affects several characters (bits) of the resulting ciphertext, 
ideally, all the characters within one block. If this condition is 
fulfilled, then the encryption of two data blocks with minor 
differences between them should produce two completely 
different blocks of ciphertext. The same requirement should be 
held between ciphertext and key, i.e. one character (bit) of the 
key should affect several characters (bits) of the ciphertext. 
Diffusion obscures relationships between the ciphertext and 
the original text. 
Confusion refers to the property of a cipher to obscure the 
connections between characters of the original text and its 
ciphertext. If a cipher produces a reasonably good "confusion" 
of the bits of the original text, then the respective ciphertext 
does not feature any statistical or functional regularity. 
Confusion obscures the relationship between the encrypted text 
and the key. 
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In view of the above, a symmetric block encryption 
algorithm based on an SP-network was developed. We called 
the new algorithm Qamal. 
II. ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM QAMAL 
The block diagram of the developed encryption algorithm is 
presented in Figure 1. The algorithm supports the sizes of 
block and key of 128, 192 and 256 bits. The number of 
encryption rounds depends on the size of the block and key. 
For keys K with the length of 128, 192, and 256 bits, the 
number of encryption rounds is 8, 10, and 12 respectively. All 
rounds are completed with modulo 2 additions to the round 
key. The encryption algorithm includes the developed 
procedures (primitives) of key applying by bitwise addition 




Figure 1. Qamal encryption algorithm block diagram 
In the first procedure, the operation of applying (addition to) a 
key modulo 2 (XOR operation) on a plaintext block is 
performed.  
The second procedure is the formation of a substitution S1-
box, where a nonlinear transformation on bytes is performed, 
i.e. a nonlinear bijective substitution is applied to each byte. 
The resulting S1-box is shown in Table I. 
The third procedure is the formation of Mixer1 box. The box 
bytes are represented by a two-dimensional array А of size 
𝑚 × 4,  where  𝑚 takes the value of 4, 6 or 8 depending on the 
initial block size. 
 A = [
a00 a01 a02 a03
a10 a11 a12 a13
. . . .
am0 am1 am2 am3
].  
The bytes of each column are added to each other modulo 256:  
 M1(bij) = ∑ aij mod 256
m
i=0 , j = 0,3.  
Then the new byte obtained in the first column replaces the 
uppermost byte 𝑎00, while all the original bytes of the column 
rotate downshift of one position. This operation is repeated m 
times. As a result, we get m new bytes in the first column. 
Next, the operation is performed for the other three columns 
(Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Mixer1 box workflow 
TABLE I.  
SUBSTITUTION TABLE FOR S1-BOX 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 
0 C9 34 F0 18 55 86 21 6B 87 D2 6E 99 BD 31 98 89 
1 29 73 83 8B 1A 19 E1 E4 F3 5B 72 3F A6 F9 2E A3 
2 7E 10 94 07 EC AD 2F 26 20 93 66 3D DD 64 5F C1 
3 13 E0 80 25 D3 08 75 6A B9 2D D1 CC FD CA 3B FC 
4 D5 DA E2 CE A0 7F AE C8 9C 09 3C 95 BA 35 3E 7B 
5 FA 8D 23 AB D9 E8 74 2A C3 A8 D8 52 45 B5 0A 0C 
6 A4 61 9A FB AA F6 78 84 C4 E9 EE 54 50 81 DF 90 
7 36 B4 BB 44 C5 96 4B 28 14 E6 8F FF B0 1F 53 47 
8 00 4C 40 2C 9B 9F 4A 01 7D AF 92 56 7A DB 8E 16 
9 63 24 A9 1D 33 4D E7 1C 70 69 B7 C6 32 E5 57 03 
A 97 A5 EB D4 BC 5D F8 85 06 F2 59 F4 17 22 38 DC 
B 0B FE BE CD 41 82 04 0E 48 71 30 AC EF C7 2B CB 
C B8 8C 5A 42 A7 4E D0 46 BF B3 91 E3 11 7C 6F DE 
D 88 58 1E 5C 9D 60 C0 62 05 79 ED 76 C2 02 65 D7 
E F1 8A 77 F7 37 B1 0F 67 CF 0D A1 6C 4F 3A 39 1B 
F 27 B6 5E F5 EA 6D 15 9E B2 12 A2 68 43 51 49 D6 
 
The fourth procedure is the transformation of Mixer2. As a 
consequence of the formation of Mixer1 box, we get the new 
array 𝐵 of size 𝑚 × 4, where m takes on values of 4, 6 or 8 
depending on the block size: 
 B = [
b00 b01 b02 b03
b10 b11 b12 b13
. . . .
bm0 bm1 bm2 bm3
].  
Each row of the array is represented in the form of a cubic 
polynomial with the coefficients from the finite field 𝐺𝐹(28). 
These polynomials appear as follows: 
 bi(x) = bi0x
3 + bi1x
2 + bi2x + bi3, i = 0, . . . ,3 .  
 Each polynomial 𝑏𝑖(𝑥) multiplies by fixed (preselected) 
polynomials 𝑚𝑖(𝑥)  modulo  𝑝(𝑥): 
 m0(x) = 168  x
3 + 34x2 + 187x + 186, 
 m1(x) = 210x
3 + 53x2 + 210x + 101, 
 m2(x) = 218x
3 + 25x2 + 150x + 210,  
 m3(x) = 144x
3 + 75x2 + 158x + 27,  
 m4(x) = 163x
3 + 4x2 + 111x + 106,  
 m5(x) = 150x
3 + 237x2 + 13x + 53,  
 m6(x) = 99x
3 + 59x2 + 104x + 205, 
 m7(x) = 167x
3 + 49x2 + 241x + 154,  
 p(x) = x4 + x + 55.  
The polynomials 𝑚𝑖(𝑥) are used in the following manner. If 
the size of the plaintext block is 128 bits, then the first four 
polynomials 𝑚0(𝑥), 𝑚1(𝑥), 𝑚2(𝑥), 𝑚3(𝑥) are selected. For 
the block size of 192 bits, the first 6 polynomials  𝑚0(𝑥), 
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𝑚1(𝑥), 𝑚2(𝑥), 𝑚3(𝑥), 𝑚4(𝑥), 𝑚5(𝑥) are taken. For the third 
possible block size, all the eight polynomials are used.  
III. DECRYPTION ALGORITHM QAMAL 
To decrypt a ciphertext, all the cryptographic transformations 
used for encryption are inverted and applied in the decryption 
algorithm in reverse order. Round keys are also used in reverse 
order. In the process of decryption, for each above-mentioned 
block size, it is performed respectively 8, 10 and 12 rounds 
with inverse operations InvS, InvMixer1, and InvMixer2 in 
each round. 
Operation InvS is the inverse of the operation of obtaining 
elements in the S-box. Bytes of the S-box array are replaced 
with new bytes obtained through the inverse substitution. As a 
result, we get the inverse S-box. 
Operation InvMixer1 is inverse of the transformation 𝑀1(𝑏𝑖𝑗).  
Operation InvMixer2 is a procedure inverse to the one for 
obtaining Mixer2 box. To obtain the inverse box of Mixer2, 
each row of the array is considered as a four-termed 
polynomial over 𝐺𝐹(28). This polynomial multiplies by fixed 










−1(x).   
 
TABLE II 
 INVS (S1-BOX INVERSION) 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 
0 80 87 DD 9F B6 D8 A8 23 35 49 5E B0 5F E9 B7 E6 
1 21 CC F9 30 78 F6 8F AC 03 15 14 EF 97 93 D2 7D 
2 28 06 AD 52 91 33 27 F0 77 10 57 BE 83 39 1E 26 
3 BA 0D 9C 94 01 4D 70 E4 AE EE ED 3E 4A 2B 4E 1B 
4 82 B4 C3 FC 73 5C C7 7F B8 FE 86 76 81 95 C5 EC 
5 6C FD 5B 7E 6B 04 8B 9E D1 AA C2 19 D3 A5 F2 2E 
6 D5 61 D7 90 2D DE 2A E7 FB 99 37 07 EB F5 0A CE 
7 98 B9 1A 11 56 36 DB E2 66 D9 8C 4F CD 88 20 45 
8 32 6D B5 12 67 A7 05 08 D0 0F E1 13 C1 51 8E 7A 
9 6F CA 8A 29 22 4B 75 A0 0E 0B 62 84 48 D4 F7 85 
A 44 EA FA 1F 60 A1 1C C4 59 92 64 53 BB 25 46 89 
B 7C E5 F8 C9 71 5D F1 9A C0 38 4C 72 A4 0C B2 C8 
C D6 2F DC 58 68 74 9B BD 47 00 3D BF 3B B3 43 E8 
D C6 3A 09 34 A3 40 FF DF 5A 54 41 8D AF 2C CF 6E 
E 31 16 42 CB 17 9D 79 96 55 69 F4 A2 24 DA 6A BC 
F 02 E0 A9 18 AB F3 65 E3 A6 1D 50 63 3F 3C B1 7B 
IV. ROUND KEY GENERATION ALGORITHM  
Round keys 𝐾𝑖 are generated from the cipher key K with the 
use of the key extension procedure. Eventually, we get an 
array of round keys, which is then used to select a needed 
round key. The scheme for obtaining round keys is presented 
in Figure 3. 
The procedure of generating round keys involves all the 
transformations used in the process of encryption, save a 
different substitution table (S2-box, Table III), and a new 
transformation Module pi(x).  
Module pi(x). Let 𝑝1(𝑥), 𝑝2(𝑥), … , 𝑝𝑆(𝑥) be binary irreducible 
polynomials used as working bases (not to be confused with 
modulo 𝑝(𝑥) used in Mixer2), and 𝑃(𝑥) =
𝑝1(𝑥) 𝑝2(𝑥) … 𝑝𝑆(𝑥). The polynomial 𝑃(𝑥) degree 𝑁 = 𝑚1 +
𝑚2 + ⋯ + 𝑚𝑆 is equal to the block size (i.e. 128, 192, 256). 
The output data from the Mixer2 box we represent in the form 
of binary polynomial 𝑁(𝑥). Here 𝑘1(𝑥), 𝑘2(𝑥), … , 𝑘𝑠(𝑥) are 
remainders of dividing polynomial 𝑁(𝑥) by respective bases 
𝑝𝑖(𝑥), 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑠, where 𝑝𝑖(𝑥), 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑠 are secret elements 
of the key schedule procedure.   
 
 
Figure 3 – Key Ki extension scheme, where i =0,1,…,6 ( 8,10) 
V.  EXPERIMENTAL TESTS OF THE AVALANCHE EFFECT 
When developing encryption algorithms, it is imperative to 
analyze them for their strength against various types of 
cryptographic attacks. Among the most common standard 
methods at present are attacks based on linear and differential 
cryptanalysis. The essence of the latter is to track the change in 
the difference between the values of the output bits depending 
on the change in the input bits (in the original data) on 
different rounds of transformation. A necessary condition for 
ensuring the strength of an encryption algorithm against 
differential cryptanalysis is the presence of the avalanche 
effect in the basic transformation. 
The avalanche effect is an important cryptographic property 
for encryption, wherein small changes in the input bits or key 
bits result in avalanche changes in the output ciphertext bits. If 
an algorithm fails to provide the avalanche effect to a required 
level, then a cryptanalyst can make predictions about the input 
data, being given the output. To estimate the degree of the 
avalanche effect in the transformation, an avalanche parameter 
was determined and used – the numerical value of the 
deviation of the probability of a bit change in the output 
sequence in response to a bit change in the input sequence 
from the required probability value equal to 0.5 [13]. For the 
avalanche-effect criterion, the value of the avalanche 
parameter is determined by the formula ε = |2ki − 1|, where i 
is the sequence number of the altered bit in the input, 𝑘𝑖 is the 
probability that half the output bits are changed following a 
change in the i-th input bit compared to the output value for 
the initial (unchanged) input value.   
The formula shows that the extremity ε can take values from 0 
to 1 inclusive. The closer ε is to zero, the better is the 
algorithm. And vice versa, the closer the value of ε is to 1, the 
weaker is the algorithm. 
 




S2-BOX USED IN GENERATING ROUND KEYS 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 
0 55 A8 78 9C C3 ED B1 DE CD 2C 09 51 27 2D 43 C2 
1 CA 45 3A CE 7B 79 84 7D BF E6 69 1F 5E CB 9E E2 
2 49 38 8E 7C 31 DF 98 42 91 57 90 A6 BD F1 41 AC 
3 20 96 8C C7 4B BE 70 E9 D0 4D 1A A1 B0 DA 5D D3 
4 88 B5 30 47 6B 35 12 B2 B4 17 10 A2 60 9B 0D FD 
5 E4 C6 54 EB B7 B9 7F AF 21 5C D4 99 5F 3E A9 F3 
6 3C C0 67 13 6A 2F 1C 29 89 58 73 EC 14 39 D8 4E 
7 44 02 59 23 F2 0C FC AB 74 87 92 36 82 04 16 0E 
8 BB 01 F6 15 E7 DC 8F 07 4A FF 65 1B 25 8B 75 D7 
9 A5 7A A7 FA 24 E5 AE 61 CF 9D 32 66 AA 05 D2 62 
A 8D C4 4F 26 06 0A D9 7E F7 E3 F0 34 40 0F FB 1E 
B 6F A3 D1 BA 95 3D 33 71 83 18 E0 CC 2B A0 D5 28 
C E1 64 9F 97 4C A4 76 B3 19 08 68 C1 22 1D B8 8A 
D E8 50 00 C9 46 56 5A 72 F5 3B 63 94 93 9A 0B AD 
E DD C8 FE 5B 53 85 6E EE 86 80 F9 52 81 11 2A 48 
F C5 EA EF DB B6 3F 37 77 6D 03 2E D6 F4 BC F8 6C 
 
The structure of the Qamal encryption algorithm consists of 
the procedures of key addition using bitwise addition (XOR), 
substitution S-box, and mixing Mixer1 and Mixer2. Consider 
an example of how the transformations used in the algorithm 
affect the avalanche effect.  
As an input, we take two plaintexts that differ from each other 
by only one bit. To encrypt them, we use the same key. We 
find out how this change is diffused to half the block in one 
round: 
Plaintext 1(Т1) – {00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00} 
Plaintext 2(Т2) – { 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00} 
Key – {CD BF 03 36 9E AD 5E F3} 
Т1⊕К  – {CD BF 03 36 9E AD 5E F3} 
Т2⊕К – {CC BF 03 36 9E AD 5E F3} 
S(Т1⊕К) – {7C CB 18 75 57 22 0A F5} 
S(Т2⊕К) – {11 CB 18 75 57 22 0A F5} 
M1 S(Т1⊕К) – {EB 12 90 D9 21 1A 4D E7} 
M1 S(Т2⊕К) – {93 12 90 D9 75 1A 4D E7} 
M2 M1 S(Т1⊕К) – {B8 55 8B 3E 22 C3 50 38} 
M2 M1 S(Т2⊕К) – {40 F9 93 A8 16 3D 55 C0}.  
 
The first selected plaintext in binary representation consists of 
only zeros. The second plaintext also consists of zeros, with 
the exception of the eighth bit. Bitwise addition operation 
(XOR) does not affect the propagation of changes. A change of 
one bit in the substitution S-box impacts only on one byte, and 
in the operation Mixer1 – on every fourth byte. After the above 
operations, the Mixer2 operation is performed resulting in the 
change of the entire ciphertext. Specific numerical 
characteristics are given below. 
The developed algorithm was tested for the avalanche effect. 
For testing purposes, a random 128-bit plaintext was selected. 
After the inversion of one bit in each position, 128 new 
plaintexts were obtained, and all the texts were then encrypted. 
The probabilities 𝑘𝑖 between the obtained ciphertexts and the 
original one were calculated after each round. The results of 
the analysis after the first and eighth rounds are given below 
(Tables IV and V). The average value of 𝜀 was 0.07 and 0.062 
respectively. The smaller the value of the avalanche parameter, 
the stronger the avalanche effect is in the transformation.  
The generated keys were also tested for the avalanche effect by 
changing the key bits in the same way as in the plaintext. The 
results obtained were also positive. The analysis results are 
represented in Figure 4. As could be seen from Figure 4, the 
value of 𝑘𝑖 is within the interval of (0.4; 0.6).  
If the cipher operates with the information presented in binary 
form, then inverting even one bit in the block of original data 
will result in independent changing the values of all bits in the 
corresponding block of encrypted data with the probability of 
1/2. It is impossible to break such a cipher in a way less 
expensive in terms of the number of necessary operations than 
exhaustive search over the set of possible key values. This 
condition is mandatory for the cipher of the type in question, 




Figure 4. Analysis of the avalanche effect for a key in the full-round algorithm 




ANALYSIS OF THE AVALANCHE EFFECT FOR THE QAMAL ALGORITHM 
AFTER THE FIRST ROUND 
i ki i ki i ki i ki 
1 0,48 33 0,40 65 0,47 97 0,51 
2 0,46 34 0,45 66 0,44 98 0,49 
3 0,50 35 0,47 67 0,46 99 0,44 
4 0,53 36 0,48 68 0,45 100 0,55 
5 0,62 37 0,49 69 0,45 101 0,55 
6 0,48 38 0,53 70 0,48 102 0,41 
7 0,48 39 0,44 71 0,50 103 0,47 
8 0,47 40 0,46 72 0,56 104 0,48 
9 0,46 41 0,57 73 0,46 105 0,49 
10 0,48 42 0,50 74 0,57 106 0,52 
11 0,55 43 0,46 75 0,44 107 0,57 
12 0,44 44 0,55 76 0,49 108 0,48 
13 0,48 45 0,49 77 0,49 109 0,57 
14 0,44 46 0,52 78 0,48 110 0,44 
15 0,55 47 0,48 79 0,48 111 0,51 
16 0,52 48 0,56 80 0,47 112 0,45 
17 0,40 49 0,55 81 0,53 113 0,44 
18 0,51 50 0,46 82 0,48 114 0,52 
19 0,51 51 0,49 83 0,51 115 0,55 
20 0,43 52 0,51 84 0,50 116 0,55 
21 0,42 53 0,48 85 0,45 117 0,52 
22 0,45 54 0,48 86 0,53 118 0,47 
23 0,45 55 0,44 87 0,41 119 0,52 
24 0,58 56 0,47 88 0,54 120 0,42 
25 0,47 57 0,52 89 0,50 121 0,49 
26 0,52 58 0,50 90 0,47 122 0,50 
27 0,45 59 0,53 91 0,54 123 0,45 
28 0,52 60 0,51 92 0,51 124 0,49 
29 0,54 61 0,63 93 0,52 125 0,49 
30 0,52 62 0,51 94 0,51 126 0,53 
31 0,52 63 0,54 95 0,53 127 0,59 
32 0,51 64 0,48 96 0,48 128 0,54 
 




ANALYSIS OF THE AVALANCHE EFFECT FOR THE QAMAL ALGORITHM 
AFTER THE EIGHTH ROUND 
i ki i ki i ki i ki 
1 0,48 33 0,50 65 0,46 97 0,52 
2 0,52 34 0,54 66 0,50 98 0,54 
3 0,43 35 0,48 67 0,51 99 0,46 
4 0,48 36 0,52 68 0,51 100 0,41 
5 0,44 37 0,44 69 0,42 101 0,54 
6 0,48 38 0,49 70 0,46 102 0,46 
7 0,48 39 0,50 71 0,50 103 0,51 
8 0,50 40 0,56 72 0,41 104 0,52 
9 0,49 41 0,48 73 0,52 105 0,56 
10 0,48 42 0,48 74 0,50 106 0,55 
11 0,52 43 0,48 75 0,45 107 0,51 
12 0,45 44 0,55 76 0,41 108 0,45 
13 0,52 45 0,49 77 0,41 109 0,48 
14 0,52 46 0,45 78 0,54 110 0,50 
15 0,50 47 0,48 79 0,55 111 0,52 
16 0,50 48 0,54 80 0,52 112 0,53 
17 0,47 49 0,52 81 0,45 113 0,54 
18 0,49 50 0,52 82 0,52 114 0,57 
19 0,49 51 0,48 83 0,55 115 0,58 
20 0,53 52 0,49 84 0,53 116 0,50 
21 0,56 53 0,50 85 0,52 117 0,50 
22 0,48 54 0,54 86 0,45 118 0,45 
23 0,51 55 0,48 87 0,56 119 0,55 
24 0,50 56 0,47 88 0,53 120 0,58 
25 0,55 57 0,47 89 0,52 121 0,45 
26 0,51 58 0,48 90 0,46 122 0,46 
27 0,50 59 0,47 91 0,54 123 0,43 
28 0,49 60 0,55 92 0,52 124 0,48 
29 0,50 61 0,49 93 0,48 125 0,49 
30 0,43 62 0,49 94 0,48 126 0,45 
31 0,45 63 0,48 95 0,56 127 0,60 
32 0,54 64 0,47 96 0,47 128 0,49 
VI. CIPHERTEXT TESTING FOR STATISTICAL SECURITY 
In the process of developing ciphers, the task of analyzing their 
cryptographic properties arises, one of the stages of which is 
statistical testing. To automate this stage, it is necessary to 
have a standardized methodology so that the results of 
statistical testing of various ciphers can be compared [14]. 
Of particular importance in cryptography is the task of 
statistical testing of a numerical sequence. To date, there is no 
single standard set of criteria for evaluating the properties of 
bit sequences. Various statistical tests evaluate to what extent a 
bit sequence under consideration is “similar” or “not similar” 
to a truly random sequence. In each such test, the so-called null 
hypothesis of the randomness of the sequence is checked (the 
alternative hypothesis assumes that the sequence is not 
random). In this case, the significance level α is set, i.e. the 
probability of a false-negative result and 0.01 or 0.001 is often 
used as the value for this level. To evaluate the sequence in 
each statistical test, the so-called P-value is calculated – the 
probability that an ideal random sequence generator will 
generate a sequence “less random” than the sequence being 
studied. The sequence randomness hypothesis is accepted if P-
value ≥ α, otherwise it is rejected. 
The methods for assessing the quality of random and pseudo-
random sequence generators can be divided into two groups: 
1) Graphical tests. The properties of sequences are represented 
in the form of graphical dependencies, by the form of which 
conclusions are drawn about the proximity of the sequence 
under consideration to a random one. 
The following tests can be attributed to this category: a 
histogram of the distribution of sequence elements, plane 
distribution, monotonicity testing, etc. 
2) Assessment tests. The statistical properties of sequences are 
determined by numerical characteristics. Based on the 
assessment criteria, conclusions are made about the degree of 
proximity of the properties of the analyzed and truly random 
sequences. Unlike graphical tests, where the results are 
interpreted by users with possible differences in their 
interpretation, assessment tests provide a numerical 
characteristic that unambiguously determines whether the test 
is passed or not. 
To test sequences for randomness, there are a large number of 
algorithms, and for convenience, software products containing 
some test suites have already been implemented. Among them, 
the most common tests are NIST STS, DIEHARD, CRYPT-X, 
tests by D.  Knuth, and others. 
One of the first sets of statistical tests was proposed by D. 
Knuth in 1969 in his classic work “The Art of Computer 
Programming”. The tests are based on the χ2 statistical 
criterion. The calculated value of the χ2 statistics is compared 
with tabular results and a conclusion is drawn about the quality 
of the sequence. The advantages of these tests are their small 
number and the existence of fast algorithms for their 
execution. 
A ciphertext, subject to its statistical properties, should not 
differ from a random sequence. The process of investigation of 
the statistical properties of ciphertexts comprises the following 
sequential procedures [5,15,16]: 
- Plaintext encryption; 
- Execution of the set of statistical tests for the ciphertexts 
obtained; 
- Analysis of the statistical testing results for the ciphertexts; 
- Decision on the properties of the ciphertexts obtained. 
The computer-based testing was conducted by means of the 
"Computer-aided system for selecting statistical tests and 
graphical tests" software package. To investigate statistical 
properties, graphical and assessment tests were applied. 
For the computer-based testing of the algorithm we used:  
- 20 files differing by their sizes and extensions; 
- 10 different keys. 
By using the selected keys and plaintexts we obtained 200 
ciphertexts, and then tested them for statistical security. For 
this purpose, a developed software package was used, which 
embodied a quality evaluation system for encrypted texts 
based on graphical and assessment tests. 
The results of graphical tests are interpreted by users, so a 
disparate treatment thereof is possible. Contrastingly, the 
assessment tests output a specific numerical rating, which 
makes it possible to uniquely determine if a test has been 
passed or not. 
The histogram of the assessment tests is shown in Figure 5. 
The results of assessment tests are as follows: the criteria of 
equidistribution test (frequency test), serial test, serial by 
character test, gap test, poker test (partition test), coupon 
collector's test, permutation test, run test, and serial correlation 
test were met by 95%, 98%, 96%, 95%, 98%, 96%, 98%, 95%, 
100% of ciphertexts respectively. 




Figure 5. Assessment testing results 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Modern block encryption algorithms are subject to the 
requirements related to their applicability, feasibility, and other 
factors. The benefits of the developed algorithm are as follows: 
the algorithm could be effectively implemented in special-
purpose hardware, intended for the execution of encryption 
and decryption operations; it could be easily modified for 
different levels of security; the transformations used in the 
algorithm allow for parallel computing (encryption). The 
results of conducted analyses showed that a minor change in 
an original message gives rise to a strong change in the 
encrypted message even with the use of the same key. This 
cipher property obscures the relationships between the 
characters of the original text and ciphertext.  
From the viewpoint of an adversary, a secure cryptosystem is a 
black box, input and output information sequences of which 
are mutually independent, provided that the output ciphered 
sequence is pseudorandom. Thus, a ciphertext obtained is 
investigated for pseudo randomness by using statistical tests 
(testing) and cryptanalytic techniques. The statistical tests 
showed that the ciphertexts exhibit good statistical properties. 
When developing encryption algorithms, it is imperative to 
analyze them in terms of the strength against different 
cryptographic attacks. Among the most commonly used at 
present standard methods are attacks based on the linear and 
differential cryptanalysis [17-20]. The developed algorithm 
was investigated against these attacks. As is known, the 
strength of most algorithms against differential and linear 
analysis is secured by their S-boxes. This triggered a large 
number of studies concerning the properties of S-boxes. The 
algorithm uses pre-developed and investigated S-boxes. The 
findings are described in [21-23]. The study of the 
cryptostrength of the algorithm begins with the cryptanalysis 
of each transformation separately. Then, depending on the 
results obtained, an analysis of the entire algorithm, i.e. for the 
whole round transformation, is conducted. The study of the 
algorithm strength for separate procedures showed good 
results, which suggest the cryptographic strength of the 
developed algorithm and the possibility to study the algorithm 
comprehensively, i.e. considering all transformation 
procedures and rounds. We continue the work on the security 
of the algorithm, and the results obtained will be available in 
the coming papers. 
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